

ATTACHMENT E.4. BEYOND THE LEFT-RIGHT DIVIDE

[These are preliminary notes; new and revised text is in preparation.]

E.4.a. Past and Recent Initiatives

Over recent decades many initiatives have sought to bring together people who espouse differing political ideologies. Most of these efforts have been directed at relatively short-term advantage, either electorally or in pursuit of a set of policy objectives. Other initiatives have sought to generate new, syncretic ideological configurations all together, and to institutionalize the results of these efforts. Several initiatives of both these sorts, focused mostly on politics in the United States, are noted below.

1. In the 1950s William Buckley and Frank Meyer proposed a strategy – **Fusionism** - of bringing the libertarian right and the communitarian right together under the big tent of American conservatism, which in turn mobilized politically through the Republican Party. The election of Ronald Reagan three decades later has been seen as a vindication of this fusionist strategy.

2. From the 1930s to the 1960s the base of Democratic Party **was the communitarian left in the North and the historically anomalist white rural Jacksonians** in the South and West. Jacksonians are strongly individualist and nationalist, and support federal economic assistance. From the late 1960s through 2008 the Democrats struggled to accommodate both the communitarian left and a growing libertarian left. Many saw the successful 2008 and 2012 elections of Barak Obama as evidence that the Party had successfully done so. Some foresaw a decline in the communitarian left and predicted an emerging “center-libertarian” Democratic Party base.¹

3. **Donald Trump’s** successful 2016 presidential campaign confounded many analysts. His platform broke with many conventional conservative Republican positions and advocated policies regarding trade, job creation, infrastructure spending, social security, foreign policy and other topics that suggested populist, statist, and isolationist/nationalist ideological elements. Although Trump was opposed by much of the established Republican Party leadership he kept most of the Republican voting base and he added portions of the white working class who in the past had largely voted Democratic. It’s of course unknown if this success was a one-time fluke or if it might be a harbinger of at least a partial realignment.

4. The historic ability of the two major parties to incorporate differing ideological constituencies has made it difficult for more ideologically pure third or fourth parties to form and sustain themselves. A minor exception is the **U.S. Libertarian Party**, formed in 1971, which fields candidates in about a thousand state, local and national races each election cycle, including the presidential race. At the beginning of 2017 Libertarians held 210 elected offices, all at the state and local level. The Libertarian candidate in the 2012 presidential race, former New Mexico Governor Gary Johnson, received just under 1% of the total vote cast.² He was re-nominated in 2016, when it was thought that the manifest unpopularity of both major party candidates gave the Libertarians an opportunity to break into higher percentiles. Mid-campaign polls showed Johnson winning as much as 10% of the vote, but he finished with an unspectacular 3.3%.

5. **Communitarianism** enjoyed a boom among academics, pundits and centrist Democrats during the 1990s as a response to the ascendant movement conservatism of the Republicans. In 1990 sociologist Amitai Etzioni established the Communitarian Network to serve as a base for communitarian thinking, writing and organizing. The following year over 100 noted public intellectuals and others signed and promulgated the *Responsive Communitarian Platform*. In 1995 President Clinton held a two-day White House conference dedicated to communitarian ideas. But the concept and the term didn’t gain traction, and by the early 2000s communitarianism had largely faded from public view.³ Communitarian values, however, remain widely shared (see Box E-2 below), but it’s unclear how, when or through whom these might find explicit political expression.

6. Also during the 1990s, a different but somewhat analogous school of political thought, commonly dubbed **The Third Way**, developed in the UK and elsewhere. It called for a reformed social democracy in which state ownership of production and other statist policies were abandoned but strong government action to ensure equal opportunity and economic growth and equity was maintained. Prominent figures identified with The Third Way included UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and sociologist Anthony Giddens (1999). By the early 2000s it too had faded from view.⁴

7. In 2002 former US Senate majority leaders Howard Baker (R-TN), Tom Daschle (D-SD), Bob Dole (R-KS) and George Mitchell (D-ME) founded the *Bipartisan Policy Center* (BPC) to develop and advocate for centrist policies addressing energy, the economy, national security, health and other issues that in principle could gain support from both Republican and Democratic constituencies. In 2014 the BPC had a staff of about 80 and a budget of close to \$20 million. In 2005 the DC think-tank *Third Way* was established to support centrist positions within the Democratic Party. It addresses issues of economics, national security, clean energy, and social policy, and has a staff of about 30. Both the Bipartisan Policy Center and Third Way receive significant corporate funding and have been charged with being hawkish on defence policy and beholden to Wall Street financiers.⁵

8. The efforts noted above were largely initiated by and involve high-level influentials. A number of **grassroots-oriented initiatives** have also sought to bridge ideological differences, often around controversial issues. These include *Public Agenda*, *Everyday Democracy*, *Public Conversations Project*, *America Speaks*, the *National Issues Forum* and *LivingRoomConversations.org*. They vary in method and style but in general seek to organize face-to-face discussions among representative Americans in local communities, making sure that persons holding alternative positions on any issue are included. Some involve elected officials and issue experts as well. Topics that one or more of these initiatives have addressed recently include the US budget deficit, racial justice, early childhood development, energy/climate/sustainability, police-community relations, Israeli-Palestinian relations, religion and gay rights, pro-life and pro-choice perspectives on abortion, post-genocide reconciliation, affordable higher education, post-Katrina rebuilding, and food justice. These initiatives differ, of course, from the many grassroots activist organizing projects throughout the country whose strategy calls for mobilizing aggrieved constituencies against a targeted adversary. Most of these are highly ideologically partisan with, as examples, the Right-to-Life and Tea Party movements on the Right and gay rights and pro-Choice movements on the Left. Many of the major grassroots organizing initiatives rooted in the work of Saul Alinsky make efforts to work across ideological lines at the community level, but generally end up identifying with the Left, and especially so when working at the state and national levels.

9. The **Tea Party movement** that began in 2009 draws heavily from Jacksonians and from both the libertarian and communitarian right. A 2010 survey suggested that of the 17% of Americans who described themselves as being “part of the Tea Party movement,” 57% were Republicans, 28% were Independents and 13% were Democrats.⁶ The Tea Party movement was successful in mobilizing electorally during the 2010 elections, and to a lesser extent during the 2012 and 2016 elections as well.

10. The **Occupy movement** that began in 2011 drew heavily on both the libertarian and communitarian left. It was not successful in sustaining itself organizationally, but can be credited with having played a major role in putting the issue of income and wealth inequality prominently onto the early 21st century public agenda.⁷

11. In response to the perceived growth of political polarization and policy gridlock, in 2011 several DC-based political operatives began an initiative called **Americans Elect**, with the intent of organizing a bipartisan 2012 presidential and vice-presidential third-party campaign. Some \$35 million in funds were raised and ballot access was secured in 45 states, but serious candidates were not forthcoming and the effort was disbanded.⁸

12. In 2015 Jonathan Haidt and others began a number of initiatives to encourage “viewpoint diversity” in academia. See *Heterodox Academy*. See also Haidt and Iyer (2016) on ways in which deepening political polarization in the United States might be countered.⁹

13. In 2010 centrist U.S. elected officials and party operatives organized **No Labels** to initiate and support bipartisan policy measures. Founding co-chairs were Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-CT) and Gov. Jon Huntsman (R-UT). Co-chairs as of 2017 were Sen. Susan Collins (R-ME) and Rep. Joe Manchin (D-WV). *No Labels* has been criticized as out-of-touch with public antipathy towards centrist/establishment/corporate policies; see [Rich \(2010\)](#).

14. Following the 2016 president election Bill Galston (Brookings; former Bill Clinton aide) and Bill Kristol (*Weekly Standard*; former G.W. Bush aide), published "**a New Center in American Politics**," a manifesto decrying polarization in American politics and the demoralizing 2016 elections. The manifesto was praised by centrist David Brooks (2016) and denounced by left-progressive Malory (2016) and Linkins (2016). Galston and Kristol subsequently organized the web-based policy and convening project [The New Center](#).

15. **Better Angels** is "a bipartisan citizen's movement to unify our divided nation," organized by [the Institute for American Values](#). It hopes to develop an organizational methodology that would depolarize votes who identify as Red or Blue; not by having them change their values, but by having them *adopt additional values* that they understand would facilitate working together on major social concerns they have. *Better Angels* hopes to have 8 million people go through its program over the 10 years beginning 2017. See the above links; also [Blankenhorn \(2018\)](#).

16. The **Bridge Alliance** promotes networking, resource sharing, cooperation and collaboration among some 80 organizations focused on working across conventional partisan divides in the U.S. In April 2018 it held a large scale "National Week of Conversation."

17. **American Affairs** is a quarterly journal seeking to provide intellectual coherence to some of the policy and political positions and perspectives associated with Donald Trump during his 2016 presidential campaign, with particular attention to those that cut across conventional Red/Blue lines. The magazine's editor, Julius Kreim, disavowed support for Trump following the President's remarks regarding the August 2017 events in Charlottesville. Kreim, a 2008 Harvard College graduate, identifies himself as a conservative and a nationalist but specifically repudiates white nationalism.

18. Writing in the Intercollegiate Studies Institute *Modern Age* blog, [Samuel Goldman \(2017\)](#) proposes a new Fusionism of **traditionalism + populism** to replace the traditionalism + libertarianism of Frank Meyers and the conservative wing of the Republican Party that more or less prevailed until the 2016 elections. Goldman says let the Democrats have the fickle libertarians, we'll take the patriotic populists.

19. The **Blue Labor** (or Blue Socialist) tendency within the UK Labor Party is critical of both Blairite centrist-neoliberalism and Corbynite Left internationalism for disregarding the true interests and values of the UK working class. It proposes instead a socially conservative socialism. It advocates strong localist, communitarian and egalitarian practices over reliance upon conventional bureaucratic welfare state programs. Its rhetoric evokes an early 20th c. distributist and solidarist sensibility; its motto is "Work, Family, Community." Blue Labor supporters include Radical Orthodox theologian [John Milbank](#)s. It has been criticized as "Paleo-Labor". Blue Labor proponents were split on the 2016 Brexit vote. See [Davis \(2011\)](#) and this LSE pro/anti Blue Labor [exchange](#).

20. In spring 2018 a loose congeries of disparate thinker-types dubbed the "**Intellectual Dark Web**" received attention for their common dissatisfaction with identity politics and perceived growing lack of civil discourse. Participants include anti-Trump conservative Ben Shapiro, leftist evolutionary biologists Bret Weinstein and Heather Heying, conservative feminist writers Christina Hoff Sommers and Ayaan Hirsi Ali, centrist social psychologist Jonathan Haidt, atheist somewhat-lefty Sam Harris, liberal Enlightenment enthusiast Steven Pinker, Canadian clinical psychologist and classical liberal Jordan Peterson and perhaps a dozen others. Over the past several years most have come to popular attention in the course of their involvement in often-heated controversies in which they claimed their voices were being suppressed. It's not clear if this network will become any more formalized than the informal arrangement it is now. A fair number of the participants have become web/social media celebrities with millions of followers. See [Weiss \(2018\)](#).

ATTACHMENT E.4 - BEYOND THE LEFT-RIGHT DIVIDE (cont.)

E.4.b. Four-Quadrant maps of political ideology [See Discussion Notes 187-197. See also **BOX E.4-2** for a selection of political spectrum maps using the Nolan Chart format and variations.]

1. Box E.4-1 below compares the results of several surveys that have attempted to measure the extent to which Americans subscribe to ideological perspectives of the sort described in **BOX H** of the main outline text. The results of the surveys are not strictly comparable because the questions used to identify the particular ideologies differed. Also, the Gallup, USA Today and Reason-Rupert polls surveyed general population samples, whereas the American National Election Survey (ANES) polled those who voted in the four US federal elections held in 2006-2012. The figures shown for the ANES (column 5) are the averages for each ideological category over 2006-12. The sixth column shows the average of the 2006, 2010 and 2006-2012 surveys. The 2011 survey did not include a “moderate” category and so is not included in the averages.

BOX E.4-1. FOUR-QUADRANT MAPS OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|---|
| | Share of population (%) | | | | | |
| Political Ideology | 2006 Gallup ¹⁰ | 2010 USA Today ¹¹ | 2011 Reason-Rupe ¹² | 2006-2012 ANES ¹³ | Average (excluding Reason-Rupe) | Correspondence to categories shown in Box H |
| Conservative | 27 | 17 | 28 | 27 | 24 | Communitarian Right |
| Liberal | 24 | 24 | 28 | 23 | 24 | Libertarian Left |
| Libertarian | 20 | 22 | 24 | 17 | 20 | Libertarian Right |
| Populist/Communitarian | 20 | 20 | 20 | 15 | 18 | Communitarian Left |
| Middle/Moderate/other | 9 | 17 | na | 18 | 15 | “Centrist” |

2. A quantitative thought-exercise sheds light on the possibility of a realignment of the sort suggested in the main outline text and in DN 189, that is, one in which the Communitarian Left and Communitarian Right newly align in opposition to a similarly newly aligned Libertarian Right and Libertarian Left. Let’s assume that an equal 20% of the relevant population (residents, citizens, voters or other category) falls within each of the five ideological categories shown in **BOX H** in the main text and in Column 1 of BOX E.4-3 below. (This isn’t quite consistent with the values shown in Column 6 above but it’s close enough for the purposes of this thought-exercise at this time.)

3. In Columns 2 and 3 of BOX E.4-3 we posit imagined plausible ways in which those ascribing to our four political ideologies might distribute their allegiance between the two major U.S. political parties, with each party ultimately getting 50% of the total. (Again, these are gross assumptions for purposes of this exercise. Survey studies could generate real numbers, and perhaps this has been done, but a brief search for such results was unsuccessful.)

4. Now suppose that a new Communitarian movement arises, and as shown in **Column 4** (Realignment Scenario 1) wins the support of 100% of the Communitarian Left, 45% of the Communitarian Right, 45% of the Libertarian Left, 70% of the Center, and 0% of the Libertarian Right. This gives us just 52% support for the new movement. While this might be enough to win some close electoral contests, it falls short of the numbers needed to successfully realize transformational policies and practices of the sort we’ve been considering. If we run the same exercise again as shown in **Column 5** (Realignment Scenario 2), this time heroically assuming 100% of the Communitarian Left, 65% of the Communitarian Right, 75% of the Libertarian Left, 90% of the Center, and 0% of the Libertarian Right, we end up with 66% support. This might be a large enough margin to achieve major legislative policy wins and institutional reform, but is it sufficient to motivate deeper systemic changes in life-ways, vocational trajectories, family socialization practices and more? I don’t know. But my intuitive sense is that changes of the sort and magnitude we have been considering might require sustained popular support in the range of 70%-80%.

BOX E.4-3. SIX REALIGNMENT SCENARIOS

| 1 | Current | | Six Realignment Scenarios | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|--|-----------|---------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| | DPT | RPT | RS 1 | RS 2 | RS 3 | RS 4 | RS 5 | RS 6 |
| <i>Ideological Category</i> | <i>Percent of the Population of each Category supporting each Realignment Scenario</i> | | | | | | | |
| Communitarian Left | 80 | 20 | 100 | 100 | 20 | 45 | 100 | 10 |
| Communitarian Right | 20 | 80 | 45 | 65 | 90 | 75 | 40 | 30 |
| Libertarian Right | 20 | 80 | 0 | 0 | 90 | 60 | 0 | 100 |
| Libertarian Left | 80 | 20 | 45 | 75 | 0 | 20 | 60 | 35 |
| “Centrist” | 50 | 50 | 70 | 90 | 50 | 60 | 40 | 45 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| Total Popular Support (%) | 50 | 50 | 52 | 66 | 50 | 52 | 48 | 45 |

Current Party Alignments:

DPT: Democratic Party Today
 RPT: Republican Party Today

Realignment Scenarios:

RS 1: “Populist Democratic Party”
 RS 2: “Super-Majoritarian Populist People’s Party”
 RS 3: “Populist-Right Republican Party” (Trump electorate)
 RS 4: “Civic-Republican Democratic Party”
 RS 5: “Left-Progressive Democratic Party”
 RS 6: “Techno-Progressive Republican Party”

5. **Column 6** (RS 3) shows imagined plausible shares of support that Donald Trump might have received from each of our ideological categories. **Column 7** (RS 4) shows plausible shares of support for a “Civic-Republican Democratic Party” in part consistent with our description in DN 153. **Column 8** (RS 5) shows shares of support consistent with a Left-Progressive Democratic Party, perhaps of the sort imagined by supporters of Sen. Bernie Sanders. **Column 9** (RS 6) shows support for a Techno-Progressive Party, here nominally Republican, perhaps consistent with elements of Discussion Notes 21-28, 34-38 and 47-54.8. The total popular support figures shown in the bottom-most row suggest that none of these would easily command supermajorities of ~ 60-66%, much less hypermajorities of 70-80%.

6. If it’s true that a world of economic justice, ecological integrity and technological responsibility would require support on the part of 70-80% of the population in order to successfully undertake the sorts of radical transformations needed, our task will be difficult. Ironically, many who care deeply about these matters would be reflexively uneasy at the thought of being part of something that commands 70-80% support. In much of the West we have become so accustomed to closely-fought legislative and electoral contests, with 52-48% victories considered landslide wins conferring mandates, that we question whether much beyond such tallies is possible, or even desirable, in a diverse, pluralistic society. We are concerned, and in context rightly so, about what happens to the other 20-30% of the population. Once more, the privileged status we give to individual conscience and preferences may be at odds with the sorts of collective consensus required for a fully just, sustainable, and technologically responsible human future.

7. Very large majorities require, by definition, a decrease in polarization. Beinart (2017) makes a pertinent observation regarding the relationship between *religious belief* and polarization. He suggests that although the religiously grounded culture wars of the last half-century, focused largely on different beliefs associated with sexual morality and family life, have wound down as organized religion has become less of a foundational institution in American life, they are being replaced by a new and even more viscous *secular culture war*, this time with a focus on race. He cites survey and other data showing that a) White social conservatives who do *not* attend church tend to be more virulently anti-Black, anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic, and tend to identify more with the Alt-Right, than do those who do; b) White church-going Democrats backed Clinton by 26 points, while white non-churchgoing Democrats backed Sanders by 13 points; and c) Many Black Lives Matters activists explicitly reject the leadership of black religious leaders. Beinart concludes that the increase in secularization is contributing to the

increase in polarization. It may be the case that if we want to decrease polarization such that supermajorities of the degree needed to effect a true and potent realignment are possible, religious belief, or a philosophy capable of compelling the same moral commitment that religious belief can, will be necessary.

E.4.c. Analysis of Votes Cast in the 2016 Presidential Election, by Ideological Commitment.

BOX E.4-4 shows the results of a survey conducted by the Voter Study Group (2017) of a random sample of those who voted in the 2016 presidential elections. A battery of questions was posed to determine preferences on many of the key issues raised during the election. The responses to these questions were used to determine how “liberal” or “conservative” voters were along two dimensions: an “Economics” dimension and a “Social/Ideology” dimension. Combinations of liberal and conservative tendencies along these two dimensions generate four politico-ideological categories:

| | <u>Economics</u> | <u>Social/Ideological</u> | <u>Labels used in BOX H</u> |
|---------------|------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Liberals: | liberal | liberal | Libertarian Left |
| Populists: | liberal | conservative | Communitarian Left |
| Conservatives | conservative | conservative | Communitarian Right |
| Libertarians: | conservative | liberal | Libertarian Right |

Each voter is shown by a dot placed at their 2-dimensional locus. Clinton voters are in blue, Trump voters in red, and other voters in yellow.

The two heaviest concentrations of voters show mostly Clinton voters in the lower left and mostly Trump voters in the upper center. Trump voters are somewhat more diffusely located along the economics dimension than are Clinton voters, and Clinton voters are strongly less diffusely located along the social ideology dimension than are Trump voters.

The share of the voters that fall in each ideological quadrant are:

| | | Clinton | Trump | Other |
|---------------|------|----------------|--------------|--------------|
| Liberals: | 45 % | 37 | 3 | 5 |
| Populists: | 29 % | 6 | 19 | 4 |
| Conservatives | 23 % | - | 20 | 2 |
| Libertarians: | 4 % | 1 | 1 | 1 |


Clinton got her 48.2 by getting almost all of the Liberals and scattered Populists. Trump got his 46.1% by getting nearly all the conservatives and ~ 2/3 of the populists.

From the perspective of partisan strategy, there are several ways for a Democrat to win. One is to move just far enough to a more moderate position on social issues to attract enough of the populists without losing core base voters. If partisan emotions are becoming more intense, an alternative strategy is to motivate a greater number of liberals and left-populists to get to the polls and vote. [turn-out stats in preparation].

From the point of view of reducing partisan tensions the results of this survey are not especially encouraging, as the two strongest voting blocs are quite some distance apart ideologically. It’s possible to imagine a left-populist candidate who eschews Trumpian racism but takes a carefully nuanced moderate stand on social issues, keeps 34% from the liberals, gets 12% from the populists and 5% from scattered others and thus squeaks to a majority. As we’ve discussed, however, a squeaker is not what we need for transformative change of the sort we’re considering in this working paper: we need a dominating majority or perhaps even effective consensus.

A tentative conclusion from this review is that such strong majorities are not likely to be realized in the short run. Thus a deeper and more likely longer term strategy is called for.

BOX E.4-4. 2016 Presidential Election Mapping of Ideologies and Partisanship



Source: Voter Study Group (2017)

<https://www.voterstudygroup.org/publications/2016-elections/political-divisions-in-2016-and-beyond>

E.4.d. Collier: Growth with justice + social maternalism + inclusive nationalism + hard pragmatism

Collier (2017) says that the UK, Europe and the West in general is facing intense anger from those who are removed from the metropolitan hubs and are less educated, and who see themselves as honest everyday citizens struggling against the well-educated metropolitans clever enough to reap unjustified wealth and who are promoting a global elite multiculturalism that serves their own interests.

To effectively address this difficult situation he offers this program:

1. Focus on policies that encourage **growth with justice**. Example: tax pockets of huge wealth rather than income and wealth *per se*:
 - a. Tax those living in large metropolitan hubs (connectivity creates rents)
 - b. Tax the well-educated (enables connectivity which creates rents)
 - c. Redesign corporate CEO taxes to:
 - tax high corporate CEO pay (it's often largely a rent)
 - discourage "short-termism" and encourage investment in worker skills & technology
 - d. Tax financiers and lawyers, not innovators
2. Restrict immigration ["there is no moral basis for a global right to migrate"]
3. To deal with disruptive change:
 - a. Give those disrupted by change the legal entitlement to substantial compensation.
 - b. Tax those services and products causing greater disruption (not punitively, but enough to cover social costs of the disruption).
 - c. Provide mentoring and other support for those with less education, esp. to assist with child-rearing and other assistance to offset growing education/class advantages.
4. "Open the schools:" Provide effectively free education for all at all levels.
5. **Social maternalism**: The state should be active in both economic and social policy but shouldn't overtly empower *itself*; rather, it should empower families and communities.
6. Promote **inclusive nationalism**. Nationalism is the only force strong enough to give millions of people a common identify; it encourages the affluent to be generous with those who are not affluent. If inclusive nationalism (eg, the Scottish National Party) is not promoted, exclusive nationalism (eg, French National Front) will fill the socio-political gap.
7. Promote Western cultural values: formed in the 17th c, they enabled the industrial revolution, democracy, rule of law, etc. to develop.
8. Political leadership must display **hard pragmatism**, i.e., "being willing to send your friends to jail" if they violate the law.

Collier encapsulates the message of his book *The Plundered Planet: Why We Must, and How We Can, Manage Nature for Global Prosperity* (2010), in this manner:

Nature – Technology + Regulation = Starvation
Nature + Technology – Regulation = Plunder
Nature + Technology + Regulation (Good Governance) = Prosperity

Comment: Collier's commitment to addressing social and economic inequity appears to be sincere, as does his willingness to suggest dramatic measures to accomplish this. But his entire program rests on the presumed ability of the global economy to grow indefinitely, and he doesn't address the profound societal implications of the technologies now being developed to sustain that growth.

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E.4.e. Commentary on the Challenge to Liberal Democracy; “Post-Liberalism”

Three commentaries that appeared after the November 2016 election, one by a liberal and two by conservatives, capture some of the important challenges facing liberal democracy today. Excerpts:

- **Marc Fleurbaey.** 2016. “Why Populism Challenges Democracy from Within.” *American Prospect*. 25 November.

“Populism today has four important aspects: It flourishes in democratic political systems; it represents a radical form of majoritarian action; it flourishes amid social distress and increasing economic inequality; and it presents a threat to constitutional democratic procedures and institutions... In a globalized world, populism plays two roles: It denounces social inequality and decries the privileges of the wealthy few, and it calls for renewed national unity in the name of “the people.” By highlighting ethnic understandings of democratic popular sovereignty, it lays bare the weaknesses of many liberal-democratic norms, and shows how dependent on underlying social conditions modern representative democracy can be... Although populist leaders promise to include the excluded and overturn an elected oligarchy, once in power they usually deploy central government tools to attack the institutions of liberal democracy. They repress social movements and oppositions and limit civil liberties and media freedoms. In short, even though modern populist movements are an understandable expression of current malaise in many democratic countries, they cannot lead to any sustainable democratic remedies.”

- **Ross Douthat.** 2016. “The Crisis for Liberalism.” *New York Times*. 19 November.

“But liberal societies have always depended on an illiberal or pre-liberal substructure to answer the varied human needs — meaning, belonging, a vertical dimension to human life, a hope against mortality — that neither John Stuart Mill nor Karl Marx adequately addressed... Unfortunately the values of “Imagine” are simply not sufficient to the needs of human life. People have a desire for solidarity that cosmopolitanism does not satisfy, immaterial interests that redistribution cannot meet, a yearning for the sacred that secularism cannot answer... Thus it may not be enough for today’s liberalism, confronting both a right-wing nationalism and its own internal contradictions, to deal with identity politics’ political weaknesses by becoming more populist and less politically correct. Both of these would be desirable changes, but they would leave many human needs unmet. For those, a deeper vision than mere liberalism is still required — something like “for God and home and country,” as reactionary as that phrase may sound. It *is* reactionary, but then it is precisely older, foundational things that today’s liberalism has lost. Until it finds them again, it will face tribalism within its coalition and Trumpism from without, and it will struggle to tame either.”

- **Peter Leithart.** 2017. “Is Calvin Among the Liberals?” Patheos.com. 16 June.

1. “Liberalism’s stated aim is to construct a society without substantive commitments, leaving everyone free to choose whatever his or her or hir own may be. Liberalism’s common good is to protect society from adopting any single vision of the common good. That’s a deviation from classical and traditional Christian politics (including Calvin’s), which sought to orchestrate common life toward a common end—the cultivation of virtue or the glory of God. In fact—and this is the other side of the critique—liberal societies do have substantive commitments. The liberal state pretends to be a referee, but beneath the striped shirt it wears the jersey of the home team. Under the cover of neutrality, liberal order embodies, encourages, and sometimes enforces an anthropology, ecclesiology, and vision of the good society that is often starkly at odds with Christian faith. Tuininga never confronts that line of analysis.”

2. German sociologist (and Nazi sympathizer) **Carl Schmitt** made the case that “liberal democracy” is an oxymoron, because liberalism and democracy are actually *opposed* to one another rather than complementary. He had in mind a different understanding of “democracy” than is today common in the West. He saw democracy as existing when a country’s leadership *identified with* the masses and had their interests at heart. Schmidt said that this has in fact been the normal and universal relation between the masses and legitimate leaders for most of human history. He said as well that such institutions as the *separation of powers* and *representative democracy*, so lauded in the democratic West, are in fact institutionalized inefficiencies that work *against* the interests of the masses.

- **Ross Douthat. 2016 “Among the Post-Liberals.” *New York Times*. 8 October.**

Douthat notes that despite its generations-long hold on life in the West, the secular liberal democratic capitalist order is facing new and serious challenges. He provides a taxonomy of several extant groupings.

1. The New (left-wing) Radicals: newly inspired by Marxian thought, committed to social & economic justice.

Websites: Jacobin, n + 1.

Groups: Democratic Socialists of America; Black Lives Matter; “The Resistance.”

People: Bernie Sanders, Naomi Klein, Ta-Nehisi Coates.

2. The New (right-wing) Reactionaries: hostile to both democracy and egalitarianism. Several diverse wings:

1. Much of the Alt-Right; white nationalists

2. “Intellectuals for Trump”

3. Euro-pessimists and cynics, e.g. Michel Houellebecq.

4. Silicon Valley billionaire Techno-Utopians, e.g. Peter Thiel. “Monarchists for Transhumanism.”

3. Religious Dissenters:

A. Tactical Retreatists: subcultural resilience in the style of Orthodox Jews, Mennonites, Mormons.

B. On the Offense: millennials disillusioned with post-Vatican II Catholic politics, drawn instead to either:

1. a revived **Catholic Integralism** (see DN 218.2 and Attachments E.5.a, E.5.c and G.1.a.1.)

2. a **Tradinista! Catholic Socialism** (see Attachment E.5.c.)

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E.4.f. Concluding Comment

This cursory review illustrates the variety of approaches used by those seeking to cross, combine, collaborate among or transcend conventional ideological categories. Some apply in the world of ideas, others in the world of community engagement, others to policy advocacy and others to electoral politics. Some approaches involve building coalitions of the center, others seek to build coalitions of groups mostly on one end or another of a spectrum, and still others involve building coalitions of those on the further ends of a spectrum and similarly alienated from the center. As of yet none of these efforts have risen to the level, scale and intensity necessary to spark major social, political and cultural realignment, innovation or transcendence of the sort referenced in this working paper outline. The polarizations and tensions – indeed, enmities - that have brought us to this moment are deep and have been building for some time, and are unlikely to resolve themselves easily or quickly.

¹ See Ross Douthat's commentary on former President Obama as the "liberal Reagan," who has prevailed by uniting and mobilizing the libertarian left and communitarian left rather than by moving towards the center.

² See the Libertarian Party website and the Wikipedia page.

³ For background on communitarianism see the Wikipedia entry and The Communitarian Network website. See the account of the varieties of communitarian thought and politics by scholar Gary Dorrien, in which he classifies former President Obama as a "liberal-leaning, moderate, pragmatic communitarian." See this account by Will Marshall, president of the Progressive Policy Institute, on the rise and decline of communitarian initiatives during the Clinton administration and the relevance of communitarian thinking today.

⁴ For an overview of the Anglo-American "Third Way" movement see the Wikipedia entry, this account by Tony Blair, and Giddens's account of what he originally meant by the term "Third Way" and why he stopped using it.

⁵ See the website and Wikipedia page of the Bipartisan Policy Center, and this critical assessment. See the website and Wikipedia page of The Third Way, this critical assessment, and this one as well.

⁶ The 2010 Winston poll also suggested that two-thirds of those identifying with the Tea Party movement described themselves as conservative, 26% as moderate and 8% as liberal.

⁷ See their respective Wikipedia pages for information and analyses concerning the Tea Party and the Occupy movements, and for links to many related sites.

⁸ See the Americans Elect website and Wikipedia entry, as well as this critical assessment.

⁹ Jonathan Haidt and Ravi Iyer. (2016). "How to Get Beyond Our Tribal Politics." *Wall Street Journal*. 4 November.

¹⁰ Wall Street Journal, January 1, 2006.

¹¹ USA Today, October 11, 2010.

¹² Ekings, Emily. 2011. "Reason-Rupe Poll Finds 24 Percent of Americans are Economically Conservative and Socially Liberal, 28 Percent Liberal, 28 Percent Conservative, and 20 Percent Communitarian." *Reason.com*, 29 August.

¹³ Carmines et al. (2013).

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SOURCE LINKS FOR CHARTS IN BOX E.4-2.

CHART A. <https://thosebastardsinwashington.wordpress.com/2012/02/29/beyond-left-and-right-part-1/> Beyond Left and Right. ThomWooley.

CHART B. <http://www.beaconhillacademy.org/lessons/political-spectrum-lesson-plan.html> . Beacon Hill Academy -Political Spectrum Lesson Plan

CHART C. <http://acorn.nationalinterest.in/2012/03/03/nitimandala-the-indian-political-spectrum/> Niti-Mandala; The Indian Political Spectrum.

CHART D. http://ww31.rationalrevolution.net/articles/redefining_the_political_spectrum.htm - RationalRevolution.net

CHART E. <https://www.tumblr.com/tagged/political-spectrum> TUMBLR - POLITICAL SPECTRUM

CHART F. <https://ockhamsbeard.wordpress.com/2011/01/23/political-spectrum-2-1/> Ockham's Beard

CHART G. <https://pjmedia.com/zombie/2010/10/11/the-electric-tea-party-acid-test/> PJMedia.

CHART H. <http://www.stephankinsella.com/2009/10/better-than-the-nolan-chart> Stephan Kinsella.com

CHART I. <http://asplundchart.blogspot.com/2013/01/asplund-chart-early-version.html> . The Asplund Chart

CHART J. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Revised_NPOV_political_chart.jpg . NPOV Political Chart – Christopher Erickson.

CHART K. <http://mydailyquizz.com/the-definitive-political-orientation-test/> . Definitive Political Orientation Test.

CHART L. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_spectrum#/media/File:Inglehart_Values_Map.svg – Inglehart-Welzel World Values Survey